Overview

Investment Objective

The Fund seeks to provide long-term capital appreciation along with some current income; it also seeks to mitigate adverse volatility in returns.

Strategy

The Fund invests primarily in the securities of companies located in developing countries. The Fund invests in several asset classes including dividend-paying common stocks, preferred stocks, and fixed-income securities.

The performance data quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. Future returns may be lower or higher. The investment return and principal value will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than the original cost. View the Fund’s most recent month-end performance.

Sources: ALPS Fund Services, Inc., Bloomberg, Morningstar, Seafarer.

Portfolio holdings are subject to change.

1. Seafarer Capital Partners, LLC has agreed contractually to waive and/or reimburse fees or expenses in order to limit Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waiver / Expense Reimbursements (inclusive of acquired fund fees and expenses, and exclusive of brokerage expenses, interest expenses, taxes and extraordinary expenses) to 1.05%, 1.15%, and 1.35% of the Fund’s average daily net assets for the Institutional, Investor, and Retail share classes, respectively. This agreement shall continue at least through August 31, 2026.
2. The 12b-1 Fee is included in the Gross Expense Ratio for SFGRX.
3. Shareholders who sign up for an Automatic Investment Plan can request a waiver of the Institutional Class investment minimum. View the waiver program criteria.
4. Calculated as a harmonic average of the underlying portfolio holdings.
5. Based on consensus earnings estimates for next year. Excludes securities for which consensus earnings estimates are not available.
6. © Morningstar, Inc. All rights reserved. The Active Share data is proprietary to Morningstar and/or its content providers; may not be copied or distributed; and is not warranted to be accurate, complete, or timely. Neither Morningstar nor its content providers are responsible for any damages or losses arising from any use of this information. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Performance

• Total Returns
• Return Characteristics

Total Returns

As of (Prior Month)

43	NAV / Index Level ()					Annualized					Cumulative	Inception Date	Net Expense Ratio2	Gross Expense Ratio2
		YTD	1 Mo	3 Mo	1 Yr	3 Yr	5 Yr	7 Yr	10 Yr	Since Inception1	Since Inception1

As of (Prior Quarter)

43	NAV / Index Level ()					Annualized					Cumulative	Inception Date	Net Expense Ratio2	Gross Expense Ratio2
		YTD	1 Mo	3 Mo	1 Yr	3 Yr	5 Yr	7 Yr	10 Yr	Since Inception1	Since Inception1

The rates of return are hypothetical and do not represent the returns of any particular investment.

Fund performance is presented in U.S. dollar terms, with U.S. jurisdiction distributions reinvested on a gross (pre-tax) basis. For the Bloomberg and Morningstar indices, performance is calculated to reflect the reinvestment of dividends, capital gains, and other corporate actions net of foreign jurisdiction withholding taxes. The performance data quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. Future returns may be lower or higher. The investment return and principal value will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than the original cost.

Source: ALPS Fund Services, Inc.

1. “Since Inception” returns for the Bloomberg and Morningstar indices are as of the inception date of the Fund’s Institutional and Investor share classes.
2. Seafarer Capital Partners, LLC has agreed contractually to waive and/or reimburse fees or expenses in order to limit Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses After Fee Waiver / Expense Reimbursements (inclusive of acquired fund fees and expenses, and exclusive of brokerage expenses, interest expenses, taxes and extraordinary expenses) to 1.05%, 1.15%, and 1.35% of the Fund’s average daily net assets for the Institutional, Investor, and Retail share classes, respectively. This agreement shall continue at least through August 31, 2026.
3. Source: Bloomberg Index Services Limited. BLOOMBERG® is a trademark and service mark of Bloomberg Finance L.P. and its affiliates (collectively “Bloomberg”). Bloomberg or Bloomberg’s licensors own all proprietary rights in the Bloomberg Indices. Neither Bloomberg nor Bloomberg’s licensors approves or endorses this material, or guarantees the accuracy or completeness of any information herein, or makes any warranty, express or implied, as to the results to be obtained therefrom and, to the maximum extent allowed by law, neither shall have any liability or responsibility for injury or damages arising in connection therewith.
4. The Seafarer Funds are not sponsored, endorsed, sold, or promoted by Morningstar, Inc. Morningstar, Inc. makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, to the shareholders of the Funds or any member of the public regarding the advisability of investing in the Funds or the ability of the Morningstar Emerging Markets Net Return U.S. Dollar Index to track general equity market performance of emerging markets.
5. As of 3/1/12.  The Fund’s inception date is 2/15/12 but Morningstar data is only available as of the beginning of the following month.
6. © Morningstar, Inc. All rights reserved. The data in the Return Characteristics table is proprietary to Morningstar and/or its content providers; may not be copied or distributed; and is not warranted to be accurate, complete, or timely. Neither Morningstar nor its content providers are responsible for any damages or losses arising from any use of this information. Past performance is no guarantee of future results.

Composition

30-Day SEC Yield: ()

The performance data quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. Future returns may be lower or higher. The investment return and principal value will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than the original cost. View the Fund’s most recent month-end performance.

Due to rounding, percentage values may not sum to 100%. Values less than 0.5% may be rounded to 0%.

1. The Growth and Income Fund selects a range of securities by employing distinct research capabilities across three investment styles.

   Style	Characteristics of Holdings
   Balanced	Moderately underappreciated growth	Typically moderately elevated current yield
   Growth	Higher growth potential	Typically lower current yield; sometimes no yield (dividend policy not yet established)
   Value	Lower growth potential	Typically higher current yield; sometimes no yield (dividends canceled under financial stress)

   Please note that the classification of a given security within one of three investment styles (Balanced, Growth, Value) is not driven by observable security characteristics (e.g., price/earnings or price/book ratios, or estimated growth rates) but rather by the specialist Seafarer research team that discovered, researched, and introduced the security to the portfolio. In other words, the provenance of the security's introduction to the portfolio determines its classification rather than any observable characteristics or descriptive statistics. A security's characteristics might change or fluctuate over time, but its “style” will typically remain fixed throughout.

2. Yield = dividend yield for common and preferred stocks and yield to maturity for bonds.
3. Based on consensus earnings estimates for next year.
4. Consensus EPS Growth forecasts (produced by research arms of investment banks) suggest that this company's earnings will improve, leading to substantial percentage growth in profits; however, such consensus forecasts are subject to a very high degree of uncertainty.
5. Calculated as a harmonic average of the underlying portfolio holdings.
6. Based on consensus earnings estimates. Excludes securities for which consensus earnings estimates are not available.

Distributions

For more information on the Fund’s distribution policies, please see the “Dividends and Distributions” section of the Prospectus.

Past performance is no guarantee of future results. There is no guarantee that the Fund will pay or continue to pay distributions.

Portfolio Review

During the second quarter of 2026, the Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income Fund returned 13.47%.¹² The Fund’s benchmark indices, the Bloomberg Emerging Markets Large, Mid, and Small Cap Net Return USD Index and the Morningstar Emerging Markets Net Return USD Index, returned 19.86% and 22.41%, respectively. By way of broader comparison, the S&P 500 Index returned 15.20%.

The Fund began the quarter with a net asset value of $15.32 per share. During the quarter the Fund paid a semi-annual distribution of approximately $0.482 per share. This payment brought the cumulative distribution, as measured from the Fund’s inception, to $6.487 per share.³ The Fund finished the quarter with a value of $16.90 per share.⁴

Performance

In the ninety-one days between the end of March and the end of June, the Fund generated its third best quarterly performance in its fourteen-year history, rising over 13%.⁵ Yet as the record above makes clear, the Fund nonetheless trailed the performance of the Bloomberg EM benchmark by a substantial margin. The reason for this is both simple and complex at once: I believe that critical portions of the equity market now represent a “bubble.” For the past year, and particularly during the last quarter, Seafarer has sought to steer the Fund away from participation in the speculative excess. Our decision has dampened returns in the short run; we have done so in the hope that it will reduce exposure to the eventual rupture.

I will lay out my case for the existence of a bubble below, in the Outlook section of this review. However, I note that to the extent that a bubble exists, it had an extreme effect on performance (as bubbles are wont to do). While the Bloomberg EM benchmark rose nearly 20% in the quarter, the gain was not the result of a broad-based rally. Rather, the index was propelled almost exclusively by a single sector: technology stocks (principally semiconductor companies). The tech sector alone contributed 18.4% of the index’s gain – or 93% of the upside. Yet even that extreme statistic belies the extent of benchmark’s lopsided, concentrated nature: only three stocks propelled the index 10.7% higher, or 54% of the total upside.

In over a quarter century as a professional investor, I have not witnessed such concentrated performance, or such extreme conditions. U.S. investors may fret over the prominence of the “Magnificent Seven” within the S&P 500. However, by comparison, the “Mag Seven” pale in comparison to the “Mega Three” that now dominate emerging market benchmarks’ performance and construction. Samsung Electronics (the Fund’s largest holding), Taiwan Semiconductor and SK Hynix together now represent 21.3% of the Fund’s benchmark.⁶ The same securities represent 28.0% of the largest U.S. listed emerging market exchange-traded fund (ETF).⁷ Bloomberg reported a concentration of 30.9% in the three securities within one of the most prominent emerging indices.⁸ While I do not follow U.S. equities closely enough to know the precise weight of the “Magnificent Seven” within the S&P 500, my understanding is that it was about 34% at the end of June. Thus just three stocks in the emerging markets bore 80% to 90% of the weight that the top seven stocks do in the U.S. – which itself reflects an unprecedented degree of concentration.

In contrast to the highly concentrated performance of the benchmark, the Fund derived performance from a wider variety of sources. While technology stocks made the single largest contribution to the Fund’s performance (led by Samsung Electronics), the Fund saw substantial gains from Consumer Discretionary stocks (a sector for which the benchmark saw negative contribution), Financial Services stocks (both the Fund and the index saw gains), along with Energy stocks (here too, the benchmark lost money for the quarter).

At this juncture, we believe the Fund’s diversity amongst its sources of return is both encouraging and critical: many investment strategies, whether active or passive, have grown exceedingly concentrated in and dependent on a small number of holdings. As noted above, typical emerging market strategies often hold 30% or more in just three semiconductor stocks that are intertwined with the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI). However, beyond that immediate concentration, typical strategies are highly concentrated in roughly three or four countries – Taiwan, South Korea, and to lesser extent, China and India. By contrast, your Fund is broadly diversified across countries and sectors, which is critical given that a broad-based earnings boom is underway (see the penultimate paragraph in the Outlook section below for details). We are concentrating on deriving performance from a multitude of geographies, industries and companies, rather than concentrating everything on what has worked best, recently.

One final comment, regarding performance: as noted above, the Fund paid a semi-annual distribution of approximately 48 cents per share. That constitutes the largest single distribution of current income in the fourteen-year history of the Fund by a wide margin. As the Fund’s formal objective includes the pursuit of current income, I am pleased that the underlying portfolio holdings are presently cash generative enough to fulfill that objective amply. In contrast, I note that many of the companies and stocks that are at the center of the boom of artificial intelligence pay scant or no dividends and are instead raising collectively hundreds of billions of dollars in new debt and equity.

Allocation

The Fund undertook four main changes this quarter: it added two new positions (Swire, a Hong Kong-based conglomerate, and ASL Limited, an Australia-based industrial testing company); it deleted the last vestige of its holding in Alibaba, a China-based e-commerce and AI services company; and it substantially reduced its holdings in South Korea, notably by selling the vast majority of gains in Samsung Electronics and Hyundai Mobis, the Fund’s two largest positions for the past five years.

Our Value Team’s work led to the introduction of Swire Pacific to the Fund. Swire is an Asia-focused conglomerate with roots dating back to the 1860s in Hong Kong and China. It is perhaps best known as a luxury property developer and investor, but it has business interests that span airlines (it owns the controlling stake in Cathay Pacific, arguably East Asia’s preeminent carrier) and soft drinks (it owns a key Coca-Cola concession in mainland China). Our team has been impressed by Swire’s management, particularly by its efforts to exit underperforming business, pay special dividends and repurchase shares. The company has two classes of publicly-traded stock, and the Fund has decided to add both, in varying proportions.

Our Growth Team introduced ALS Limited to the Fund. While ALS is based in Australia, it has business interests around the world, the majority of which are found in developing countries. The company has a long history, one that can be traced over 150 years. The company is a global leader in industrial testing services. Historically, the company’s primary emphasis has been on geochemistry in service to the mining industry, helping to test core samples and assays for development purposes. However, over the past few decades, the company has diversified into pharmaceutical testing (for purity, etc.), environmental testing (for compliance and abatement) and food testing (health, safety, purity, etc.). Our team was intrigued by the idea that the market seems to perceive the company as heavily dependent on the cyclical mining industry, when in fact it enjoys less cyclical – and higher quality, in our view – earnings derived from diversified sources.

The Fund exited the Hong Kong-listed common stock of Alibaba, which it has held for the past four years. The Fund experienced substantial gains in the shares, in part due to the company’s booming AI services, data management and data hosting. However, we have also observed the company’s core, historically cash-generative e-commerce business struggle with weak demand and destructive levels of competition. The Fund winnowed the position over the past few quarters in response, exiting the final shares during the quarter.

Lastly, the Fund has substantially reduced its exposure to South Korea, particularly by selling nearly all of the rapid gains that accrued in Samsung Electronics (a leading chip maker that has experienced booming demand amid global AI expenditures) and Hyundai Mobis (a producer of auto systems and parts which also happens to be perceived as an emerging leader in the nascent robotics industry). Those two positions had been the two largest holdings of the Fund for well over five years, and drove a large “overweighting” in South Korea. Both shares boomed during the quarter, swept up in the global investment frenzy over AI. The Fund sold most of those gains in order to “lean away” from what we believe to be an acute bubble that has formed among AI stocks (see the Outlook section below). The net proceeds were distributed widely across the portfolio.

Outlook

I believe global equity markets have generated yet another bubble. Any use of that ambiguous term inevitably conjures up a disparate set of reactions, so I wish to be precise: the bubble I perceive is centered upon companies associated with the adoption and propagation of artificial intelligence. In practice, and within the developing world, this means semiconductor and technology hardware stocks principally located in Taiwan, South Korea and to lesser extent, China. In the rest of the world, I suspect stocks broadly related to AI are likewise swept up in the same bubble. However, this AI-driven bubble is acute in comparison to preceding ones. Apart from AI-linked stocks, I do not perceive a broader bubble across the emerging markets, nor can I comment on global equities otherwise.

To clarify further: I am not an “AI-doubter.” I believe the technologies that lie at the center of the bubble have the potential to be highly valuable to society. Many past equity bubbles have been spun around overhyped themes and flimsy businesses. Such concerns do not seem applicable now. AI is not particularly “overhyped,” and at least the major businesses pursuing its advancement are not “flimsy.” Rather, most of the businesses are impressive, and AI technologies have the potential to usher revolutionary social and economic changes – likely in ways that we cannot yet imagine.

Yet this is at least part of the problem: rather than acknowledge the uncertainty and change that is sweeping through the global economy, investors have awarded a select few companies valuations that suggest their future dominance in a radically revised world is all but certain. Those valuations are predicated on financing plans that are unlikely to prove feasible, capital expenditure plans that are not sustainable, and growth trajectories that will likely fall short amid a rapidly changing, deeply uncertain world.

I believe there are five clear signs that a bubble has formed among many (though perhaps not all) AI-linked companies. None of these indications alone are substantial enough to prove that a bubble exists. However, when assessed collectively, I think they constitute definitive evidence of a gross market malfunction:

Amid this precarious set of conditions, I wish to emphasize that Seafarer is not attempting to delete all AI-related exposure from the Fund. We grasp the technology’s potential, and we continue to research companies and invest in stocks that should benefit from the propagation of artificial intelligence. We continue to discover plenty of positions that stand to directly or indirectly profit. Yet as we do so, we are not chasing exposure to the handful of stocks that have captivated markets, some of which appear to suffer from grossly inflated valuations.

You may assume having read the above that I am pessimistic about the outlook for markets. I am not! The bubble I have identified is an acute one, affecting AI stocks globally, but it is emphatically not a general one, affecting all stocks otherwise. Indeed, I am rather optimistic about stocks in the emerging markets apart from this acute AI bubble, as I find ample evidence that a broad-based earnings boom is underway. Earnings in the developing world are expected to grow over 60% in 2026. While AI-linked semiconductor and technology companies are the single biggest contributors to that growth rate, that growth rate is still expected to surpass 20% even if such companies are excluded from the estimate. Further, this is the third consecutive year of robust growth, as 2024 and 2025 saw substantial expansion in profits; while it’s early to rely on forecasts, initial estimates for 2027 suggest growth rates again in excess of 20% overall, and in excess of 10% excluding technology stocks. This boom characterized by sustained growth stands in sharp contrast to the preceding “lost decade” in the emerging markets, during which anemic earnings were mired in slow but steady currency losses.

Thank you for entrusting us with your capital. We are honored to serve as your investment adviser in the emerging markets.

The performance data quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. Future returns may be lower or higher. The investment return and principal value will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than the original cost. View the Fund’s most recent month-end performance.

The views and information discussed in this commentary are as of the date of publication, are subject to change, and may not reflect Seafarer’s current views. The views expressed represent an assessment of market conditions at a specific point in time, are opinions only and should not be relied upon as investment advice regarding a particular investment or markets in general. Such information does not constitute a recommendation to buy or sell specific securities or investment vehicles. It should not be assumed that any investment will be profitable or will equal the performance of the portfolios or any securities or any sectors mentioned herein. The subject matter contained herein has been derived from several sources believed to be reliable and accurate at the time of compilation. Seafarer does not accept any liability for losses either direct or consequential caused by the use of this information.

As of June 30, 2026, securities mentioned in the portfolio review comprised the following weights in the Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income Fund: ALS, Ltd. (1.0%), Hyundai Mobis Co., Ltd. (3.6%), Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Pfd. (7.0%), Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (0.8%), Swire Pacific, Ltd. CL A (0.5%), and Swire Pacific, Ltd. CL B (0.1%). The Fund did not own shares in the other securities referenced in this portfolio review. View the Fund’s Top 10 Holdings. Holdings are subject to change.

Sources: ALPS Fund Services, Inc. and Bloomberg.

Source: Bloomberg Index Services Limited. BLOOMBERG® is a trademark and service mark of Bloomberg Finance L.P. and its affiliates (collectively “Bloomberg”). Bloomberg or Bloomberg’s licensors own all proprietary rights in the Bloomberg Indices. Neither Bloomberg nor Bloomberg’s licensors approves or endorses this material, or guarantees the accuracy or completeness of any information herein, or makes any warranty, express or implied, as to the results to be obtained therefrom and, to the maximum extent allowed by law, neither shall have any liability or responsibility for injury or damages arising in connection therewith.

The Seafarer Funds are not sponsored, endorsed, sold, or promoted by Morningstar, Inc. Morningstar, Inc. makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, to the shareholders of the Funds or any member of the public regarding the advisability of investing in the Funds or the ability of the Morningstar Emerging Markets Net Return U.S. Dollar Index to track general equity market performance of emerging markets.

1. References to the “Fund” pertain to the Fund’s Institutional share class (ticker: SIGIX). The Investor share class (ticker: SFGIX) returned 13.42% during the quarter. The Retail share class (ticker: SFGRX) returned 13.33% during the quarter. All returns are measured inclusive of Fund distributions paid (in relation to Fund performance) or dividends paid (in relation to index performance), reinvested in full (exclusive of any U.S. taxation) on the pertinent ex-date.
2. The performance data quoted represents past performance and does not guarantee future results. Future returns may be lower or higher. The investment return and principal value will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than the original cost. View the Fund’s most recent month-end performance.
3. The inception date of the Fund’s Institutional Class is February 15, 2012.
4. The Fund’s Investor share class began the quarter with a net asset value of $15.21 per share; it paid a semi-annual distribution of approximately $0.479 per share during the quarter; and it finished the quarter with a value of $16.77 per share. The Fund’s Retail share class began the quarter with a net asset value of $15.19 per share; it paid a semi-annual distribution of approximately $0.473 per share during the quarter; and it finished the quarter with a value of $16.74 per share.
5. The Fund’s best two quarters occurred in the second and fourth quarters of 2020 (second best and best, respectively), in the wild and whipsaw trading conditions that accompanied the global Covid pandemic. Indeed, the worst quarter in the Fund’s history was the first quarter of 2020.
6. Bloomberg Emerging Markets Large, Mid, and Small Cap Net Return USD Index, as of 6/30/26. Combined weighting includes a 0.6% weighting in Samsung Electronics’ preferred shares.
7. iShares Core MSCI Emerging Markets ETF (ticker: IEMG), as of 6/30/26. Combined weighting includes a 0.8% weighting in Samsung Electronics’ preferred shares.
8. Bloomberg News, “Funds Fret Over $4.4 Trillion AI Trio’s Grip on Emerging Markets,” 7/13/26, in reference to the MSCI Emerging Markets Index.
9. Cleary Gottlieb, “Alphabet in Upsized $90 Billion Equity Offerings,” 6/4/26; Bloomberg News, “AI Bond Binge Enters New Era of Weak Demand and Sky-High Costs,” 7/28/26.
10. Bloomberg News, “Goldman Pitches $5.4 Billion Debt for Microsoft-Tied Data Center,” 7/29/26.
11. Bloomberg News, “AI Bond Binge Enters New Era of Weak Demand and Sky-High Costs,” 7/28/26.
12. J.P. Morgan, “AI Capex 2.0: If You Build It, They Will Finance It,” 6/17/26, pg. 4.
13. Bloomberg News, “AI Bumps Power Cost 60% as Mega U.S. Grid Fails to Hit Supply Goal,” 7/14/26.
14. Yale Clean Energy Forum, “Data Centers Want Power. Regulators Say Wait,” 11/12/25.
15. Prince William Times, “Power crunch keeps data centers in the dark,” 7/15/26.
16. Bloomberg News, “McKinsey CFO Has a Warning on AI Costs: CFO Briefing,” 8/9/26.
17. Bloomberg News, “Meta Plans to Crack Down on Employee Token Use,” 6/12/26; citing Jyoti Mann, The Information, “Tokenminimizing: Meta Moves to Curb Employee AI Usage as AI Costs Reach Billions.”
18. The Economist, “AI revenues are growing fast, but not fast enough,” 7/28/26.
19. Dario Amodei, CEO of Anthropic, has stated that the generative AI industry will form a stable oligopoly of “between three and six players … capable of building frontier models and [with sufficient access to] capital to plausibly bootstrap themselves.” Cheeky Pint Podcast, “A Cheeky Pint with Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei,” 8/6/25.
20. Leopold Aschenbrenner, Chief Investment Officer of Situational Awareness, L.P. has written that "a lead of mere months could be decisive: months could mean the difference between roughly human-level AI systems and substantially superhuman AI systems," and that “superintelligences alone … would be enough for a decisive advantage” over pre-superintelligence AI systems. Aschenbrenner, Leopold, "IIId. The Free World Must Prevail," Situational Awareness: The Decade Ahead.
21. Bloomberg News, “Meta’s Zuckerberg Defends AI Bets to Skeptical Investors,” 7/29/26.
22. More formally, I believe in a variant of the “semi-strong” form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). In the semi-strong form of an efficient market, current stock prices reflect all publicly known and available information (including historical price trends). My own variant acknowledges that market participants have sufficient access and skill to digest such information in stock prices immediately, at least with respect to information that can be known or reasonably foreseen over the next one to two years. However, I believe that information pertinent to longer-term horizons is difficult to access and to assess; fewer market participants might feasibly acquire and correctly analyze such long-term information. These investors may be too few and too small in scale to ensure markets are always and everywhere priced efficiently. Thus, my “semi-strong” variant suggests that while the market may ensure prices reflect all that is known or knowable over the next two years or so, the market might routinely misprice information pertinent to longer-term horizons (e.g. three years and beyond).
23. On 6/1/26, the day prior to Mr. Huang’s pronouncement, Marvell Technology’s stock closed the day with a price of $219.38 per share. On 6/2/26, after Mr. Huang’s pronouncement, Marvell’s stock closed at $290.72 per share, representing a gain of $71.34 per share, and a 32.5% return over 24 hours. Marvell has approximately 874.8 million shares outstanding. Given a gain of $71.34 per share, Mr. Huang’s pronouncement “created” $62.4 billion in shareholder value.
24. The Beatles, Frank Sinatra, David Bowie, Dolly Parton, Bob Dylan, John Prine and the Boss have all created incredible value by opening their mouths … but not even they can manage $62.4 billion in one go.
25. Adding to the woes of even semi-strong efficient market adherents: the market should have known (or at least discounted the probability) of prospective shareholder value creation due to strategic interaction between Nvidia and Marvell, as it was public knowledge that the former purchased a $2 billion stake in the latter several months prior. If Marvell’s worth is to be bolstered by substantial interactions with Nvidia, investors should have awarded a higher price to the stock at the time of that transaction, such that Mr. Huang’s June pronouncement would have little or no discernible effect. Further, Marvell’s stock price ostensibly “trended” even higher on “momentum” over the ensuing two days (this sort of evident “momentum” is another violation of market efficiency). The stock attained a price of $315.35 on 6/4/26. As I write in early August, that price proved to be Marvell’s ultimate peak; the stock has since declined to a price lower ($211) than where it was before Mr. Huang opened his mouth ($219).